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Case No. 19054

E:l1.UNDLRS,

oetendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, Gary Vance Saunders, was charged by
information with a violation of the following provisions of Utah
Cude Ann.

rheft;

§

<1953), as amended:

§

76-6-202, burglary;

§

76-6-404,

76-1-503(2), possession of a firearm by a restricted

petson; and § 76-8-1001, status as an habitual criminal.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

Appellant was tried before a jury with the Honorable
Jiiii:ef,

S. Sawaya, Judge, presiding in the Third Judicial District

C.ou rt

in an cl for Salt Lake County, Utah on December 28-29, 1982.

Jury 11Je<n1muus1 1• found appellant guilty of the burglary,

.,,,,, ,,--cse."s1on of a firearm by a restricted person
"'

llE'•

ember 30, 1982, before the Honorable James S.
was convicted of habitual criminal status.

nr·t'' '" 1 ·t

1-!1-icc

sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an

indeterminate term of 1 to 15 years for the burglary; l to 15
years for the theft; 1 to 15 years for possession of a firean:
and 5 years to life for the habitual criminal status.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Respondent seeks an order affirming the judgment of the
lower court.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the evening of April 24, 1982, appellant's brotherin-law, Stacy Williams, went to appellant's home in South Salt
Lake CT. 39-40).

Williams and appellant then drove appellant's

truck to the Phelps's home located in Sandy, Utah CT. 43, 68).
Upon arrival, they knocked on the front door CT. 46).

When no

one answered, they went to the side door where appellant pried
the door open using a screwdriver and pliers CT. 46). Both men
were wearing gloves at the time (T. 61). After checking to make
sure no one was in the Phelp' s home, appellant gathered together
a television set, a microwave oven, and some firearms, while
Williams, his accomplice, kept watch of the door CT. 47-50) ·
Appellant and Williams then carried the stolen items out to
appellant's truck (T. 50). Appellant placed one of the firearms
in the cab portion of the truck and then drove home (T. 50, Sll ·

-2-

f'c>l l,-iw1nq LJ,c 11
,

rhe

nolen quuds to his brother's home since appellant

lu 'JPt back to thee Heilfway House where he was residing

cc•Jt,1

1•·. S4l.
tn

return to appellant's home, Williams

W1LLi2>rns tl>efl called his cousin, Amos, their "fence",

c>lo!.-erve the go•;ds

IT. SS, 56).

Amos purchased the firearms

IT.55,56).

The next day, Sunday afternoon, April 24th, Mrs. Phelps
returned from her daughter's home where she had spent the night,
and she discovered her home had been burglarized (T. 151.
A television set,

a microwave oven, some jewelry, and two

firearms were missing

(T. 18).

The police were notified (T. 341.

Mrs. Phelps stated that neither appellant nor his accomplice,
Stacy Williams, had been given permission to enter the Phelps's
home and take possession of any items in the house (T. 21, 22).
Following his arrest, Williams showed Detective Duncan
of the Salt Lake Police Department, which home he and appellant
had burglarized (T. 65, 89).

Williams also aided other officers

in locating some of the stolen goods

(T. 62, 63).

The firearms

and the television set were eventually recovered (T. 62, 63).
None of the items stolen from the Phelps's residence were found
aurinq a search of appellant's home, but stolen goods identified
trum bu·y1ar1es in B0untiful and west Jordan were seized
IP

l
t.c•
-''"'i

'"

t 1

ia!. appellant's counsel moved to sever two

aris111q out of separate circumstances (R. 20).

3-

The cases were not joined CR. 38).

The initial trial, for th],

matter, was held December 1-2, 1982; however, during the course
of that trial, a motion for a mistrial was granted CR. 119, 120:.
The trial was rescheduled for December 28, 1982.

Prior to this

trial, on December 7th, appellant's counsel made a timely motion
to sever appellant's burglary and theft charges from the
possession of a firearm by a restricted person charge; this
motion was denied IR. 127, 138).

However, it was agreed that oo

mention of appellant's other burglaries would be made without
first establishing a foundation of materiality and giving the
defense an opportunity to object IT. lll.
At trial, it was stipulated that appellant was a
restricted person at the time of the crime, incarcerated at the
Utah State Prison, but residing at a Halfway House under a work
release program IT. 74).
Following the presentation of testimony, the jury
unanimously found appellant guilty of the burglary, theft, and
possession of a firearm charges IT. 165, 166).

Then at

appellant's request, the jury was dismissed, and appellant was
tried before the Honorable Judge Sawaya on the habitual crimiMl
charge (T. 167).

The State introduced three prior second degree

felony convictions and commitments to the Utah State Prison to
substantiate the habitual criminal charge IT. 171).
Exhibit 7 (see Appendix A) contained a certified copy
of a jury verdict finding appellant guilty of second degree

-4-

1 Jcni end H»lt in 1978, and a certified copy of both the

1,

dciri(1'1

and •_r1Ifln11t1nent

order.

;Ahibit 8 lsee Appendix Bl, in part, contained a
2 2,.:.lf1<.•i

copy of the JUdgment and commitment that showed
at that time represented by counsel, Galen Ross, had

plead yuilty to a second degree burglary charge in 1964.

Exhibit 9 (see Appendix Cl included an affidavit from
the defendant acknowledging that he voluntarily plead guilty to a
second degree burglary charge in 1977.

Galen Ross, once again

acting as appellant's counsel, certified that he had discussed
the irn[.,lirations of the guilty plea with his client.

The certi-

fied copy of the judgment and commitment shows that appellant had
been sentenced to the Utah State Prison, but was placed on
probation, then after violating the terms of his probation had
his ur iginal sentence imposed.
Beverly Tisher, Records Officer at the Utah State
Prison, identif 1ed appellant as Gary Vance Saunders and presented
ider:t ical copies of the respective judgments and commitments
which had been filed at the Utah State Prison (T. 1901.
All of this evidence relating to appellant's prior
rdon;· convictions was admitted over numerous objections by
0

''Pellant 's
jr,t

c-ounsel (T. 173, 175, 1801.

Judge Sawaya found

·'1" '-' t:, of the habitual criminal charge CR. 276-2771 •

-5-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT FAILED TO PRESERVE THE SEVERANCE
ISSUE FOR APPEAL, AND THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE
ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION
TO SEVER THE FIREARM COUNT.
Appellant contends that he was prejudiced when the
trial judge denied his motion to sever the possession of a
firearm by a restricted person charge from the burglary and theft
charges brought against him.

However, this issue was not raised

during the trial, and this Court has held consistently that it

i:

precluded from considering issues raised for the first time on
appeal.

State y, Sparks, Utah, 672 P. 2d 92, 94 (1983);

State y, Starlight Club, 17 Utah 2d, 174, 176, 406 P.2d 912
(1965).
A review of the record reveals that appellant's
made a pr el imina ry motion before Judge Peter F. Leary requesting
severance, which was subsequently denied (T. 138).

At trial,

before Judge James Sawaya, appellant failed to preserve this
issue for appeal.

Oklahoma's Court of Criminal Appeals has

addressed this issue specifically.
The law is well settled that in order to
preserve a question for review in this Court,
it must be raised in the lower court and an
exception taken to the ruling, preserved in
the motion for new trial and presented in the
petition of error.
Lovick v. state, Okl. Cr., 646 P.2d 1296, 1298 (1982> ·

-6-

since appellant failed to take an exception to the
11 cn<il,

have it preserved for appeal in the record, this

ctlld

[:,sue is irn1,rot>erly before the Court at this time.

Assuming,

that this particular issue had been properly
prPserved frn appeal, it is without merit since the trial court
d1d

nol abuse its discretion when it denied appellant's motion to

sever the counts.
This Court has established that "[al denial will be
reversed by this Court only if a defendant's right to a fair
trial has been impaired." State v. Collins, Utah, 612 P.2d 775
Furthermore, the decision to grant or deny these

11980).

severance/joinder motions "[rlests within the sound discretion of
lhe trial Judge, and this Court will not interfere with that
discretion unless it is shown to have been clearly abused."
Slate y. Peterson, Utah,

P.2d

No. 18298 (filed

AF i 1 13 , 19 8 4) •

It is the trial court judge who is to "[jludge whether
in a given case the prejudice resulting from joinder is too great
to be Justified by the broader interests of avoiding duplicative
trials."
: 9 i7 i •

United States y. Jamer, 561 F.2d 1103, 1108 (4th Cir.
lt

lt

can be found that the trial court balanced the

tactnr with the judicial economy factor when making
· ,i,,11

Lo deny appellant's motion, then there is no abuse

Ji

-7-

In the instant case, appellant merely speculates that
the jury inferred a criminal disposition in appellant, since
his charges were not severed.

There is simply no proof that

ttiE

jury was prejudiced against appellant because of the joinder.
Moreover, judicial economy was served by joinder of the charges
in order to avoid needlessly duplicative trials, since
appellant's possession of a firearm by a restricted person charge
arose out of the same factual situation as the burglary and theft
charges.
Fu rthe rmor e, in the instant case, the elements relatina
to each crime were sufficiently distinct so as to minimize the
risk that the jury might be confused by cumulating the
of the respective charges.

There is absolutely no indication

that the jury was unable to separate what evidence related to the
respective charges nor is there any evidentiary basis for
appellant's claim that he was convicted solely by reason of "his
criminal disposition."
85, 91 119641.

v. United States, 331 F.2d

In light of the fact that there were legitimate

reasons supporting Judge Leary's decision denying appellant's
pre-trial severance motion, there was no abuse of discretion.
The cases appellant cites to support his position can
be easily distinguished.

All of the cases, namely, State v.

Gotfrey, Utah, 598 P.2d 1325 119791, State y, McCumbe...t:, Utah,
622 P.2d 353 119801, and Drew y. United States, 331 F.2d 85
119641 concern multiple criminal charges that arise out of

-8-

-•!"J'-filJ;:

transactions.

The charges were brought together in

merely because the defendant was the same person in all

11101

ri1ffPrent

transactions.

The courts found reversible

•r(Gr in each ot these cases since the charges were not from a
binyle criminal transaction and did not share a common scheme or

design.
1n

Mccumber at 356,

93, Gotfrey at 1328.

the instant case, however, all of the charges arose from one

criminal transaction.

Moreover, Gotfrey and Mccumber dealt

with sexual offenses which are inherently prejudicial to a
defendant.
The one case appellant cites which is factually similar
to his case is State y. Studham, Utah, 655 P.2d 669 <1982),
which held that the denial of a motion to sever a possession of a
firearm by a restricted person charge from an aggravated assault
charge did not amount to a denial of due process.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
denied appellant's severance motion.

Indeed, in the instant case

there are good reasons why judicial economy was promoted where
the charges arose out of the same criminal transaction and the
crimes were simple and distinct, which minimized any potential
conf11s1on by the jury.

Finally, there was no proof that the jury

Lour,<J apµcl larit guilty of the charges brought against him because
''
f

'1
\ I Pc-)_ ,- 11

, ie•j

a criminal disposition from his possession of a

' 10str1cted person charge.

-9-

POINT II
THE JURY WAS NEVER EXPOSED TO PREJUDICIAL
OR INADMISSABLE EVIDENCE.
Appellant contends that when Stacy Williams, his
accomplice, testified as to the location of the stolen goods
following the burglary, Williams's response was a direct
reference to appellant's prior burglaries.

Appellant further

argues that Williams's remarks with respect to his having taken
the stolen items to "their fence" violated the court's order
the State was obliged to notify both the trial judge and opposir.9
counsel before presenting evidence of appellant's prior crimes.
However, it is clear following a review of the transcript that
the prosecutor was not questioning Williams regarding appellant's
prior crimes; the prosecutor was merely attempting to determine
where appellant had taken the stolen goods following this
particular burglary.

Therefore, the prosecutor did not violate

the trial judge's order requiring prior notification before
admitting evidence under then applicable Rule 55, Utah Rules of
Evidence (Supp. 1978).
The dialogue between the prosecutor and Williams is as
follows:l
lAppellant, in his brief, mischaracterized the nature of .
Williams's testimony by omitting defense counsel's objections

-10-

Uyou have a conversation about the two
f irearnis and the television and the microwave

0\1en-1

4

Yeah.

0
Who was participating in that
conversation?
A.

Me and Gary.

!appellant]

Q.

Who said what in that conversation?

A.

Gary told me, "Well, I got to be going
back to the halfway house so I might as well
take that stuff down and store it where we
were storing it at."
Q.
Did you have a regular place to store
things?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

Where was that?

A.

My brother's.

Q.

What's his name?

A.

Timmy Shunk.

MS. CARTER:
I have an objection.
we approach the bench?

May

(Off-the-record discussion held at the
bench).
Q.
<By Mr. Housley)
In this conversation
that you had at Gary's house, did he tell you
what to do after you got it down to the place
to store it?
A.

Yes.

0.

What did he tell you?

P

HP told me to call our fence--his name is
l"

see what he wanted to buy.

-11-

Q,

Amos?

A.

Yeah.

MS. CARTER: Your Honor, may we approach
the bench again, just briefly?
THE COURT:
rug out.

You are going to wear that

(Off-the-record discussion held at the
bench)
Q,
(By Mr. Housely)
name?

A.

Yes.

Q.

What is it?

A.

Amos Armijo,

Do you know Amos' s

After you had that conversation with Mr.
Saunders, what did you do?

Q.

A.

I did what he told me.

Q.

Tell us what you did.

A.

I took the stuff down to my brother's.

(T. 52, 53).

Williams's testimony was obviously elicited for the
purpose of establishing the course of events the night of the
burglary, and more specifically in this portion, the purpose
to establish where the stolen goods had been taken.

was

FurthermorE,

even if Williams' s "our fence" and "regular place" comment could
be interpreted as referring to appellant's prior wrongs, this
evidence was not so prejudicial to constitute reversible error
This Court has previously held that evidence relevant to

explal'

the circumstances of a crime is admissible even though it might

-12-

""' lu
,ic.1.;;;,

• 1

connect the defendant with a prior wrong.
ulah,

584 P.2d 880

<1978).

state y •

State y.

µ, , L' Ut a 11 :! d 25 7 , 4 51 P. 2 d 7 7 2 (19 6 9 l •
Mi.Ji

p

e svecifically, in Alger y. State, Okla. Cr., 603

2d 1154 (1980), the court addressed the effect to be given a

vclur>tary, tangential remark by a witness.

The defendant in

on trial for taking indecent liberties with a minor.
The victim's mother was called as a witness.

During her

testim0ny, in response to a question, the witness made a general
reference to "it having happened before" with the defendant.
Defense counsel argued that the statement was prejudicial.

The

court said:
There is only an implication of another crime
which is obvious only to defense counsel.
To extend the protection of the rule to every
possible implication which might be conceived
by defense counsel is to extend the rule to
far.
1156, quoting Burks y,
Okla. Cr., 568 p.2d 322 <1977).
W1lliams's statement parallels the type of statement at issue
A.l.g_u;

a somewhat tangential remark made in response to a

yuestion.

Appellant was given adequate opportunity to rebut

ir.

WilJiams's testimony and impeach Williams's credibility.

The

Jury weighed the conflicting testimony and rendered its
ve,d1ct.

There is absolutely nothing to indicate that the jury

L•as,,, •Ls verd1rt on William's statements that he was to take

·J'"'ds to his brother's home and then call Amos,
I·-"cc." Fu1tl1ermuie, Williams's statements are not

-13-

sufficiently prejudicial under the then applicable
Rules 4 and 45, Utah Rules of Evidence, to warrant a mistriai.
Rule 4 provides, in pertinent part:
A verdict shall not be set aside, nor shall
the judgment or decision based thereon, by
reason of the erroneous admission of evidence
unless • • • the court which passes upon the
effect of the error or errors is of the
opinion that the admitted evidence should
have been excluded on the grounds stated £nQ
probably had a substantial influence in
bringing about the verdict or finding.
(emphasis added).
Therefore, the defendant must make some showing that the verdict
was directly and substantialy influenced by the challenged
testimony, "Under Rule 4, ••

.an erroneous admission of

evidence is treated as harmless error absent a showing that it
had a substantial influence in bringing about the verdict."
State v. Malmrose, Utah, 649 P.2d 56, 59 (1982).
In State v. Creviston, Utah, 646 P.2d 750 (1982),
the defendant was on trial for the sale of a controlled
substance.

In response to the prosecutor's question concerning

the price of the cocaine, a police officer testified that the
price was lower than usual because the defendant owed money to
the State Narcotic and Provo Police Departments.

The defendant

objected to the remark as prejudicial and stated it would cause
the jury to perceive him as a regular drug dealer and hardened
criminal.

This Court held, however, that the police officer's

remark was not the type of statement which would be unduly
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,,e

,,)]to the defendant.

1 ,i11''

,)1,

1

i£

Ettui

Dodge, 12

365 P.2d 798 (1961),
verdict should not be overturned in spite of

1ury

n

y,

can be fairly concluded that the error had no

11_

prPJud1cial effect on the complaining party.

The verdict should

_,,,J 1 be overturned when the error is so substantial or

preiudicial that in its absence there would likely have been a
different result.

State y, Urias, Utah, 609 P.2d 1326 (1980).

Rule 45 makes clear that the admission of evidence is
discretionary with the trial court.

The judge may choose to

exclude evidence if he finds the risk that its admission will

create substantial danger
!emphasis added),

prejudice."

Although a judge may exclude evidence, he

shuuld do so only after concluding that an injustice will result

its admission.

by

This Court:

. . • respects [the trial judge's l
prerogative in that regard and will not
interfere with his ruling unless it clearly
appears that he so abused his discretion that
there is a likelihood that an injustice
resulted.
Utah, 599 P.2d 518, 520 (1979),

ilill
'I'his
iiCl&LMil,
'

1

rLct,

,,

11

f

652 P.2d 942 (1982) in which the Court stated

lL1h,

iss,1•c

'\·1:.

' ' - 1i

: i.:

1

position is reiterated by the Court in State y.

l hE

was not whether the evidence created prejudice,
,-,

eated

prejudice.

Furthermore, it is the

trial court to determine the prejudicial ef feet

ocLL1 ·-sion.
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At the conclusion of Williams's testimony, defense
counsel moved for a mistrial and was given the opportunity to
argue the prejudicial effect of Williams's testimony to Judge
Sawaya CT. 96).

The motion was denied leading to the inference

that the trial court weighed Williams's alleged prejudicial
statement in the testimony and found it insufficiently
prejudicial to warrant a mistrial.
Appellant cites two cases which held that the evidence
admitted to establish prior crimes was prejudicial and therefore
inadmissible.

However, State y. Dickson, 12 Utah 2d 8, 361

P.2d 412 (1961) and State y. Kazda, 14 Utah 2d 266, 382 P.2d
407 (1963) can be distinguished from this case since they addrrn
the rare situation when the evidence of prior crimes referred tc
criminal charges that had been dismissed or had not yet been
tried.

In this situation where Williams was merely explaining

what had been done with the stolen goods, there was no reference
to appellant's tried or untried prior crimes.
Appellant also argues that the presence of an unrelateo
firearm on the evidence table prejudiced the jury against him.
However, there is no proof that the jury even saw the firearm.
Judge Sawaya said when denying appellant's motion for a mistrial.
The gun, of course, was inadvertent.
I don't put much store in the fact that it
happened because I am not even sure the jury
saw it. It was just like on the table.
There is no way they can connect it up with
the evidence in this case. The only evidence
presented to them was the one of relevance.
(T. 97).
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111•

11E:tther the unrelated firearm nor Williams's

,

be reyarded as so severely prejudicial to the
.,,t t1. rnanrlale reversible error.

POINT III
APPBLLANT'S PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
WAS NOT DENIED WHEN THREE JURORS SAW
APPELLANT IN HIS PRISON CLOTHES AND
SHACKLES OUTSIDE THE COURTROOM.

In the morning, before the second day of trial began,
appellant was escorted from the elevators in the Third Judicial
District Court Building to a dressing room where he was to change
from his prison garb to his street clothing for trial CR. 508When he stepped off the elevator, three jurors, who were

'•lll.

standing, coincidentally, near the elevator waiting for the trial
to begin, saw appellant for a few seconds in his prison attire
und shackles

(R.

508-511).

As a result, later that same morning

the Judge's chambers, appellant's counsel moved for a mistrial

i 11

Counsel argued that the jurors's momentary observation

!T. 133l.

appellant in his prison attire outside the courtroom violated

1i

'Ppellant's presumption of innocence.
'c·tt'Jli
Ji·

•·

IT
,,.,

1331.

"'

"''·""

•

A month after the trial, appellant's counsel

'i·.·n tu arrest judgment and asked the court to

1·.· • U1e

1

Judge Sawaya denied this

issue

111r

·1

r

01

(R.

504).

The trial jduge said he could not

re-arguing it" but did allow the witness, Ron
Officer at the Utah State Prison, to
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testify CR. 505, 506).

Mr. Solomon testifed that he had escort,,

appellant to the dressing room to change clothes, according to
the routine, but when they stepped off the elevator en route

tl

the dressing room, three jurors standing near the elevator saw
appellant for a few seconds CR. 510).

Following this testimony,

the motion to arrest judgment on this point was denied

2621,

(R.

Again, appellant argues that he was prejudiced after viewing
appellant in his prison attire and shackles, and he is therefore
entitled to a new trial.
The cases which appellant cites in support of his
position are inapposite.

Appellant, in the instant case, was oot

compelled to stand trial in his prison clothes.

Estelle y.

Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976), Chess y. Smith, Utah 617 P.2d
341 (1980).

Furthermore, appellant was not forced to stand trial

wearing handcuffs, McKenzey v. State, 225 S.E.2d 512 (Georgia,
1976), nor was appellant escorted into the courtroom while all of
the jurors watched when his handcuffs were removed prior to
trial, Moore y. State, 535 S.W.2d 357 (Texas Crim. Ap., 1976).
Appellant never appeared in the courtroom, before the jury, in
his prison garb during the course of the trial; he was merely
seen by a few jurors for a few seconds while he was en route to
the dressing room where he changed into street clothing.

This

momentary, inadvertent observation by a few jurors is not
tantamount to an abridgement of

-18-

fundamental rights,

...

the situation where a defendant is tried in

1ke
l"''

L,L;.llo;:__v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976) far less

. 1"<1,,

c"

t";:

iud1ce inheres in a situation where a juror's

clPfe11dant in Jail uniform is fleeting and outside
Ll1P

,-

united States y. Jackson, 549 F.2d 517, 527

rr,,,,,,_

11.9 rnth C1'. J 977).

Likewise, state courts have been

:iioiri:linP•I to grant new trials when faced with similar issues.
C.lcredo's Supreme Court in People y. Dillon, 655 P.2d 841, 846
1.colu., 1983)

held that "The mere fact of exposure of a hand-

defendant is not necessarily sufficient to warrant the
g!antins of a mistrial."

In an earlier case, Colorado's Supreme

Cr·urt r11led that a defendant's exposure before two jurors in the
ltallway, when the defendant was wearing handcuffs, did not
c0nstitute reversible error.
'19 (Colo., 1970).

People y, McLean, 473 P.2d 715,

And New Mexico's Court of Appeals

606 P.2d 1111 (N.M. App., 1980) held that when the
defendant was observed in handcuffs by three jurors outside the
CcJrtroom during the noon recess, he was not prejudiced, and
tliE:refore the trial court had not erred when it denied the
df'fendant 's motion for mistrial.
In order to constitute reversible error, the exposure
:,£

u-.e defendant must be both unnecessary and prejudicial.

'.:f-''.11..-if.; _Y..__._lL,._1-..LQnf
1

ot

at 846.

It'"'" i- ively

Moreover, the defendants bear the

demonstrating prejudice.

United States

F.2d 535, 549 (5th Cir. 1977), United States
""

,:,q

f".2d 616,

617 (8th Cir. 1981).
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For valid security purposes, it was necessary to
transport appellant from the prison to the court in his prisc. 1,
clothes and shackles.

It is neither unreasonable nor

unnecessary for a defendant to be handcuffed when being moved
to and from the courtroom.

McLean y. People, 473 P.2d 715,

719 (Colo. 1970).
Moreover, besides his bald assertion, appellant fails
to affirmativley demonstrate that he was prejudiced.

Appellant

merely speculates that his presumption of innocence was injured
and that he was forced to stand trial before a partial jury.
He offers no evidence whatsoever in support of his assertions.
Furthermore, the State was taking every precaution to safeguard
appellant's presumption of innocence by providing him with an
opportunity to remove his prison garb.

There is no indication

that while en route to the dressing room appellant was
purposefully placed before the three jurors in his prison clothes
and shackles, nor was appellant forced to stand trial in his
prison clothes.

Nothing on the record indicates that

was unduly injured by the momentary observation by the jurors.
Since it cannot be shown that it was unnecessary to transport
appellant in his prison garb, and the appellant failed to make a
showing of any prejudice, the trial court's decision to deny
appellant's motion for a mistrial was not an abuse of discrttic·'
and should therefore be affirmed.
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POINT IV
TllE PROSECUTOR PROPERLY COMMENTED ON THE
EV IDE!KE DURING CLOSING ARGUMENT.

A.f'f't:llant next contends that during closing argument
the prosiccutor inappropriately commented on appellant's failure
tu testify and thereby deprived appellant of both his right to an
impartial jury verdict and his right against self-incrimination.
However, it is clear following a review of the prosecution's
argument that the prosecutor was only rebutting defense
(Ounsel's comments that appellant was not guilty by summarizing
the evidence presented during the trial which established
appellant's guilt, beyond a reasonable doubt.

The prosecutor

stated·

The first thing she said [defense
counsel] was that the defendant is not
guilty, the defendant did not commit the
burglary, the defendant did not commit this
theft, the defendant did not possess these
firearms. Now, there's no proof of that,
absolutely no proof of that. The only proof
that we have here in court and the court has
instructed you to base your decision on the
evidence -- the only proof, the only evidence
is that he did do it. That's the testimony
of Stacy Williams.
In order for you to say that defendant
is not guilty you would have to say that
Stacy Williams is lying. You would have to
say that Stacy Williams is not telling the
1· rnth about his participation, about the
rletendant's participation in this case. Now,
thaL's not proof--that's not proof that he
didn't do it. The most that you could say
tr., a ronclusion is that Stacy Williams is
',,1 ent1onally lying to you under oath. The
only conclusion you could reach, if you reach
that conclusion, is that the conclusion may
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create a reasonable doubt; so I urge you to
look at
evidence realistically. Look at
this evidence for what it is, and that is, it
is not evidence that the defendant is not
guilty.
(T. 149, lSO).

Counsel, in a criminal case, is given considerable
freedom to express views on the evidence that has been presented
at trial during closing argument.
P.2d 810, 819 (1979).

State v. Wells, Utah, 603

There can only be a reversal of a convic-

ti on if the comments made were so prejudicial or substantial that
there is a reasonable likelihood there would have been a
different result if the comments had not been made.
Sorrels, Utah, 642 P.2d 373 Cl982J.

State y.

In the instant cases, the

prosecutor was acting well within the boundaries established

for

closing argument and his comments were not prejudicial toward the
appellant; there would not have been a different result.
In State v. Kazda, Utah, S40 P.2d 949 (1979), this
Court explained that it is the duty of counsel to analyze all
aspects of the evidence and that "[tJhe prosecutor, and the
public whose interest he represents, should and does have a right
to argue the case upon the basis of the total picture shown
the evidence or the lack thereof."

at 9Sl.

And, "[t]ht

prosecution has both the duty and prerogative to analyze what thE
evidence does or does not show, as bearing on the guilt or
innocence of the defendant."
SS2, SSS Cl97 8) •

state v. White, Utah, S77 P.2d

The prosecutor, in the instant case, was me rel'
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>''E'lugative to comment on the evidence that had

,/':'Li,cing l1is

,.,,, r 1,

coonrPd;

L tho'

he made no direct or indirect reference to the

<i['l>ellant had not taken the stand.2
ln

State y, Eaton, Utah, S69 P.2d 1114 (1977), the

in his closing argument said that only "[tlhe defendnt
really knows what took place in the house" and asked "what does
the defendant tell us?"

Since those statements were direct

references to the defendant's failure to testify, this Court
reyarded the remarks as prejudicial and granted a reversal.
at

But, in this case, the prosecutor did not make any direct or
indirect statements commenting on appellant's failure to testify;
the prosecutor properly used his closing argument time to present
his theories of the evidence to the jury.

Moreover, any error that could be inferred from the

1e

comments were cured by a cautionary instruction
given by the trial judge that told the jury not to assume any
presumption of guilt if the defendant did not testify in his own
behalf (R. 214, Instruction No.

9).

Appellant also contends that the prosecutor improperly
placed the burden of proof on defense counsel.
y, Segna, SSS F.2d 226
Pn'sec111·01
0

"f1E

;,,

Appellant cites

(9th Cir. 1977) where the

told the Jury that they could presume the defendant

c. ,,,,,rder case when it had been established by the defense

11 "''

i11ap1,ru['riately cites two cases, Doyle v. Ohio,

U.'. hlU <JG761 and state y, Wiswell, Utah, 639 P.2d 146
,,

r.:'!!11re

add1ess "post arrest silence" but not the issue

to testify".
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that the defendant was insane and the burden was on the state tc'
prove that the defendant was sane.

In

the prosecutor

made direct misstatements of the law that resulted in an
inappropriate shifting of the burden of proof.

However, in thi:

case, appellant asserts that the prosecutor's statements
the burden of proof without showing when or where the burden
shifted.

Moreover, a reading of the prosecutor's statements

reveals that he never asked appellant's counsel to prove
appellant innocent.

The prosecutor just asked the jury to

consider the evidence that had been given, decide whether
Williams was telling the truth and if they believed Williams's
testimony to find appellant guilty.

The prosecutor did not

misstate the law, nor did he shift the burden of proof to
appellant.
The prosecutor stayed well within the bounds
appropriate for closing argument.

He argued the case upon Ue

basis of the total picture shown by the evidence; he did not
comment on appellant's failure to testify.

Appellant was not

injured by the prosecutor's appropriate comments on the evidence.

POINT V
APPELLANT'S STATUS AS A HABITUAL CRIMINAL
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
Appellant contends that his conviction under Utah's
habitual criminal statute should be reversed since two of the
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:1

''°'

c<>1iv1ctJ CJllS

horse ,1,,

wf'tt

_c"L' ,,, •·

which the State submitted in support of the

invalid guilty pleas.

Appellant also claims that

imposed by the trial judge following his conviction

,,,,],, the habitual criminal statute of five years to life
iwprisonn•• nt is disproportionate since his prior convictions
iall

fu1

and are

bu1glary) should be considered as "property offenses"
therefore less serious than offenses involving violence.

However, the two guilty pleas which the prosecutor offered were
not constitutionally invalid, and appellant's sentence was not
disproportionate to the crimes he had committed.

Moreover,

appellant's main contention that the sentence was disproportionate to his prior crimes since he considered his previous
"burglary" crimes to be non-violent is without merit since
burglary is considered to be, in this state, at least, a violent
crime.
A.

SENTENCING APPELLANT UNDER UTAH'S HABITUAL
CRIMINAL STATUTE WAS CONSTITUTIONAL.

Appellant contends that Utah's habitual criminal

e.
0 tat

11te is unconstitutional as applied to him since it makes no

distinction between property offenses and violent crimes.
Ttie
19-:g1

tual n iminal statute, Utah Code Ann.,

§ 76-8-1001

reads:
Any person who has been twice convicted,
__ c,.ler1ced, and committed for felony offenses
.1
one of which offenses having been at
a felony of the second degree or a
'rime which, if committed within this state
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(Supp.

would have been a capital felony, felony of
the first degree or felony of second degree,
and was committed to any prison may, upon
conviction of at least a felony of the second
degree committed in this state, other than
murder in the first or second degree, be
determined as a habitual criminal and be
imprisoned in the state prison for from five
years to life.
This Court recently reviewed

§ 76-8-1001

in State y.

Montague, Utah, 671 P.2d 187 (1983) and determined that "[tlhe
language of the statute was clear and unambiguous" and that its
purpose is to "Cmlake persistent offenders subject to greater
sanctions."

The Court did not distinguish

Montague at 190.

between persistent "violent" offenders and persistent "nonviolent" offenders, rather it grouped all persistent offenders ir.
the same category.

Moreover, the Court in Montague affirmed

the defendant's conviction as an habitual criminal after
considering his prior burglary convictions.
Furthermore, appellant's argument that Utah's habitual
criminal statute as applied to him is cruel and unusual punish1rnent because his burglary convictions were not "crimes of
violence" is without merit since burglary is considered a violent
crime.

Appellant conveniently classifies all of his prior

burglary convictions in the "non-violent" crime category.
However, the Utah Legislature has included burglary in the
•violent" crime category along with assault, rape and murder.
Utah Code Ann.,

§ 76-10-501(5)

(Supp. 1978) reads:

-26-

15)
"Crime of violence" means murder,
'vu11intary manslaughter, rape, mayhem,
robbery, burglary, housel» ea king, extortion, or blackmail accompanied
Ly threats of violence, assault with a
rla11gerous weapon, assault with intent to
t any offense punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, arson punishable
by imprisonment for more than one year, or an
attempt to commit any of the foregoing
offenses.
1fn1ur1as1s added).

£1.SQ 18 U.S.C.A.

§

4251.

Finally, despite appellant's contention to the
contrary, when using the first prong of the proportionality
review test established in Solem y. Helm, _ _ U.S. _ _ , 103
S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d No.2 637

(1983), appellant's sentence is

not su disproportionate to the crimes he has committed to
constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
The Supreme Court in Solem y. Helm held that South
Dctkota's recidivist statute, which imposed a life sentence
wlthout possibility of parole, was significantly disproportionate
t_,, thee felony which triggered employment of the recidivist

Etcotute, that of uttering a "no-account" check for $100.00.
its

In

analysis, the Court narrowly limited the extent of their

ruling and reiterated the statement made in Rummell y, Estelle,
J'i

u S

n ', 272 (1980) that • lolutside the context of capital

•, ,,;,,hn1Ecnt,

''

,S<JCcessful challenges to the proportionality of
se11tences will be exceedingly rare.• Solem y. Helm,

Jl1<= litlID Court then carefully limited its holding to
; "l U1.;t Lhe felony that triggered the defendant's life
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sentence without possibility of parole was issuing a no-account
$100.00 check •

.H.e...lm, at 653, n.21.

The Court narrowly

tailored the opinion of .H.e...lm to leave intact the Court's
previous decision in Rummell y. Estelle where it held that
sentencing a persistent "non-violent" offender under Texas's
recidivist statute was not unconstitutional.

.H.e...lm could be

distinguished from Rummell since defendant Rummel 1 was eligible
for parole twelve years after his initial confinement while
was to be imprisoned for life with no possibility of parole.
The case at hand is substantially different from litlJn
since the felonies that triggered the imposition of Utah's
habitual criminal statute were burglary, theft, and
a firearm by a restricted person, all serious offenses if
contrasted with uttering a no-account check for $100.00.
Moreover, Utah's habitual criminal statute does not prohibit the
possibility of parole.

For these reasons, appellant's

indeterminate sentence of five years to life imprisonment, with a
possiblity of parole, is not so significantly disproportionate tc
the crimes appellant has committed to be prohibited by the
Amendment.

B.

APPELLANT'S PRIOR CONVICTIONS WERE
BASED, ON VALID GUILTY PLEAS.

Appellant argues that two of his three prior
convictions were the result of invalid guilty pleas, and
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e.

, 1 ,

Ltie:cce

,,.,, , , ,.,, L

convictions could not be used in charging him as

er iminal.

However, all of the convictions were

, ,, •ltunally valid and able to support appellant's conviction
uf hal'!

L'.Jal er iminal status.
Court has ruled that if the Custodian of the

TJ11s

Records at the Utah State Prison positively identifies petitioner
.ond

produces copies of commitments on file at the prison, .s..t..a.t..e.

v. Washington, 24 Utah 2d 111, 476 P.2d 1019 !1970) or if the
State produced a certified copy of the commitments, State y,
JkilX, n Utah 2d 79, 368 P.2d 595 <1962), such proof is
sufficient to support an habitual criminal conviction.
In this case, the State produced certified copies of
the Judgments and commitments on file at the district court

clerk's office.

(..5..e..e. Appendix A, B, Cl.

The State also

produced the identical judgment and commitment orders kept on
fiJ e at the Utah State Prison.

Furthermore, Beverly Tisher,

Recorrls Officer at the Utah State Prison, testified to the
authenticity of the copies and identified appellant as Gary Vance
Saunders listed in the prior convictions (T. 188-190).

The

evidence presented to establish appellant's status as an habitual

'm•nal was sufficient.
Nevertheless, appellant contends that his 1976
""'

1t-

invalid since there is a blank space where his

''•'"':.: should be in the affidavit, wherein he knowingly
plead guilty.

However, stapled to the affidavit

by appellant's attorney certifying that he had
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discussed the implications of the affidavit with appellant anu
believed that appellant understood what he was doing.

Moreover

the judgment and commitment indicate that appellant was
represented by an attorney.

Appellant's argument that no

attorney was listed is rendered frivolous after a more thorough
examination of the records submitted c..s..e..e_ Appendix Cl.
Appellant's 1976 burglary conviction, when combined
with the 1978 burglary conviction not contested on appeal,
constitute the two convictions necessary to support an habitual
criminal charge under

§

76-8-1001.

However, even the 1964

conviction which appellant argues is invalid is found to be
valid following a review of the pertinent documents.
Appellant asserts that his 1964 guilty plea was not
voluntarily entered since (1) he was promised probation if he
would plead guilty, yet he was committed to the Utah State
Prison, and (2) he could not recall being advised of the
consequences of his guilty plea in 1964, which was later requireci
by Boykin y. Alabama, 395 U.S. 288 (1969); Burgett y. Texas,
389 U.S. 109 (1967) and McCarthy y. United States, 394 U.S. 459
(1969).

Fir st, a promise of probation by the Di strict Attorney
and appellant's attorney has no affect on the validity of a
guilty plea.

When sentencing criminals, the trial judge is not

bound by any promises made to the defendants by the attorneys.
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Utah, 585 P.2d 450, 453 <1978), State y.
i_ilah, 552 P.2d 129, 130 <1976).
Next, appellant contends that his 1964 conviction did
not meet the standards established in Burgett,

and

Appellant's assertions rests upon his own

tKCarthy.

recollection of what took place when he plead guilty.

While the

record does not indicate whether the plea was voluntarily
enteted, the record does indicate that appellant was represented
ny counsel.

And in habitual criminal cases, the State does not

the burden of proving that a guilty plea was voluntarily

have

if it can be shown that a defendant is represented by
counsel at the time of entering the plea.
h'ash.

App., 582 P.2d 883, 886 (1978).

State y, Malone,

Moreover, appellant is

contesting this conviction on his recollection alone and this
Court has stated, "In the absence of record evidence to the

contrary, we assume regularity in the proceedings below."

illll:. y. Jones, Utah, 657 P.2d 1263 Cl982l.

Since the judgment

and commitment indicate that appellant was represented by counsel

wt.en entering his guilty plea, and appellant makes only bald
assertions that his plea was not voluntarily entered, this Court
assume regularity in the proceedings below and hold that in
-•se r;f
1"

· ·---

•c

i li

1 ·-l

Llie

1964 conviction was based upon a valid guilty

the affirmation of the 196 4 conviction, there are

Lum·ictions upon which appellant's habitual criminal

-=li · '::lE- can rest.

1
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CONCLUSION

Appellant failed to properly preserve the severance
issue for review on appeal.

Furthermore, the trial court did nGt

abuse its discretion when it denied appellant's motion to sever
the possession of a firearm by a restricted person charge from
the burglary and theft charges since the charges arose from the
same criminal transaction, and the elements of the charges were
simple and distinct, thereby reducing the risk of confusion by
the jury.

Moreover, the appellant failed to establish any

prejudice against him.
The jury was not exposed to prejudicial or inadmissible
evidence.

The testimony of appellant's accomplice was elicited

to establish the events that took place the night of the crime.
The prosecutor was not attempting to place evidence of
appellant's previous crimes before the jury.

Even if the

statements inferred prior burglaries, they were not so
prejudicial to constitute reversible error.

Finally, the

unrelated firearm was inadvertent, and there was no way the jucy
could connect it with the case.
Appellant's presumption of innocence was not denied
when three jurors saw appellant in his prison attire.

The

triai

court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant's
motion for a mistrial.

It was necessary for security purposes

transport appellant in his prison garb and shackles, and
appellant failed to make an affirmative showing of prejudice.
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t

1

The prosecutor properly commented on the evidence
argument.

1

,__",

,
r)f

He did not comment on appellant's

at trial; he merely presented the State's
tht case based on the evidence presented.

Finally, appellant's sentence for his habitual criminal
slat us was not significantly disproportionate to his crimes.

And, the prior convictions that supported appellant's habitual

crirr1inal status were based on valid guilty pleas.
Therefore, appellant's convictions should be affirmed
s111ce

there was no reversible error in the proceedings at trial.
DATED this

of August, 1984.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

K

J. STEPHEN MIKITA
Assistant Attonley=:1

0
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APPENDIX A
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CASE NO.

31349

\ 1567 A

BIJRGLARY & THEFT

the

t1rne fixed for passin9 of sentence upon the above

jefenJart, the said

anoearing in person and being

tv Galen Ross as counsel, the State of Utah being
The
'rer:1

;..:

he tias

1el}al cause to

sho11 ...1hy

defendant is no11

sentence should not be

defendant answerinc he has none.
:erterce

Judgement

f'"'Jr1ounced as follows:
is

the Judgefi1ent and sentence of

Court
you Gary V. Saunders
confined and imorisoned ln the Utah
for the Indeterminate
.,.errr of l-15 years as ;:>rovided by law
for
crime cf Ourglary
Degree
Fe 1 cry) . "

1 • 1s the Judgement
sentence of
s Ccu:t triat yoc.: Gary V. Saunders
and
the Utah
tate Fr1sGn for the
: e r ..,, o' l - l 5 y ea rs a s prov i de d by l a 1·1
fer the crirne of Theft (2nd
;

1 11

F '.

l ', '1

y) .

I

that the sentences are to run concurrently.

'' e +:rt
i-'t:1

"'1-1

it

h.

oi Salt Leke County, Utah are hereby

.'1r,_e.

·tie said Garv v.

Saunders and

without

then and there to be confined in
\·,·rr1T.1
1Jne

29.

heretofore
1978

l.

APPENDIX B

"' rnc

ODTHICT COU/11 Of THE 1HlllD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN Ah1J FOR

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
- -ooOoo- --- -

-ooOoo-

STATE OF UTAH
VS
GARY VANCE

Case No.

18748

BURG LA RY IN SECOND DEGREE

February lB, 1964.

This be11'lg t .. e time beretofore set for tbe passiag of sentence

JPr10 tt'le tri1i tbio 1amed Defendant,

the Defendant appe1ri•g in person

aod being represented by Galen Boss as CO\lDSel; Assistant District

P.itorney, Peter F. Leary appearing in behalf of the State of Utab.
the Defeodant is asked if he has any legal cause to show
,,,hy sentence should not be passed upo1 bim, the Defendant answering
Lh<it he h;;is none, the follo•ing judgment and sentence is pronounced
11s follows,

to-wit:

.. The Judgment aad Sentence of this Court is
tbat you, Gary Vance Saunders, be confined
in tbe Utah State Prison for the iadeten:iin1te
term of from one (1) to t"eaty (20) years as
provided by 11" for tbe crime of Burglary In
The SecoDd Degree, as. charged in the Information".

CO!llll1l!E1''1 TO ISSUE FORTllWITH.
And, you George Beckstead, Sheriff of Salt l.ake County, Ut1h
;;,-"' hereby commeaded to tall:e the nid Gary Vance Sauader1, 11d deliver
\1

•m

1'!

ti.out delay to the Utah State Prilo1 tben aad there to be confined

'.'ll ' l 1rdance

wi \h the seateace aid comit•ent heretofore iaposed.

llERRILL C. FAUX
J UDGE

APPENDIX C

Ill[ 01\iRlrT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL

\Al T LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF

o

11

- [,, t

G

' I
1a1r1t1

,

,: E

M E N T

and

tf

Sf, I iri l [ P,

CASE NO. 30202
CITY tlO. 66617

rJ

Defendant

upon the above
r-i"'e'J defendant,

the said defendant apoearing in person and being

repcesented by Grad Rich as counsel, the State of Utah

by Glenn Iwasaki as counsel.

The defendant is now

if he has any legal cause to show why sentence should not be
:·assed
Jr 1

nim,

sentence

1s

the defendant answering he has none.

Judgement

pronounced as follows:

'It is the jud9ement and sentence of
this Court that you Gary Vance Saunders

be confined
imorisoned in the Utah
State Prison for the Indeterminate Term
,of

·e

r1 j

t..

1-15 years as provided by la>i for the
Of Bur9lary (2nd Degree Felony)."

o •1 t i s no 11 pl aced on probation under the s u o er vision of

.,"' r-, 1t hotJt10n and Parole Oepartr.ient on the conditions as
tr:e rle11,'s minute entry.

rC"'J

11

'(

re nJ tne

set for an order to show cause hearina.

.lcint

1n person and beinq represented by Gaylen Ross

1

,..,

The

of Utah bei nq represented by Spencer Aust·i n

,e ·

•ow the defendant and admits the allegations set

1

on file herein.
finds

'" 1111' tr-1ent

1

t'ie defendant has violated the terms and
and the Court orders the probation

1

''"'r"L''r

Based on the defendant 1 s

is to issue forthwith in accordance with

"·re imposed on June 17, 1977.

1

'.'r·Jered th<it the above sentence is to run concurrently
.rr' pn:es the defendant is

Al.Bl IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Solt
County, Uteh

FEB 11

'.

.

IN THE DISTRICT
IN AND !'OR

rm

.

!th...

OF IJTAH

STATE OF IJTAB,

Plaintiff,

Criminal No.

S3 ?' til /I ?-

AFFIDAVIT OF DEFBNDANT

Defendant.

I,

named defendant, under oath, hereby aclcnowledge that I have
entered a plea of guilty to the charge of
contained in the Information on file
against me in the above-entitled court, a copy of which I have

received, (or to the lesser offense o f - - - - - - - - - - - - included in the charge contained in the Information on file against me in the above-entitled court): that I
understand the nature of that cha.rge and that it is a

(degreer
and that I am entering such plea voluntarily

class)

and of my a-'n free will after conferring with my attorney
and with a knowledge and understanding of the following facts:
1.

I know that I have a constitutional right under the Con-

stitution of Utah and of the United States to plead not guilty
persons upon the charge to

and to have a jury trial by

which I have entered a plea of guilty, or to a trial by the court
should I elect to waive a trial by jury.
2.
the charge.

know that if I wish to have a trial in court upon
have a right to be confronted by the witnesses

aqd1nst me by having them testify in open court in my presence and
before the court and jury with the right to have those witnesses
examined by my attorney. I also know that I have a right to
LAKE
CERTIFY THAT THE ANNEX.EC Ar-.;0 F0R!'.:001N0 IS
A TPUE "'NO FULt. COPY CF AN ORIGINAL OOCV·
MENTON FILE IN MY OFFICE AS SUCH CLERK.
HANO ANlSEAL OF f>,6.10 COURT

AY OF
W.

BY

7

_

1...3:.2-

Dl!PU'T"f

hdve w1triesst'!9 subpoenaed by the 9tate at its expense to testify
ourt

1.1•

upon my behalf and that I

on my orwn behalf. and that if I chose not to do

,, .. ·gtify in court

9u.

could. if I elected to do so.

JI-HY can be told that this may not be held against me.

the

if I were to have a trial that the state

know that

f

prove each and every element of the crime charged to the
ion of the court or jury beyond a reasonable doubt: that

sot

have no obligation to offer any evidence myself: andt that

T '«CJJld

any ·"'erd ict rendered by a

jury whether it be that of guilty or not

guilty must be by a unanimous agreement of all jurors.
4.

know that under the Constitutions of Utah and of the

united States that I have a right against self-incrimination or
a right not to give evidence against myself and that this means
that I cannot be compelled to admit that I have committed any
crime and cannot be compelled to testify in court upon trial unless
choose to do so.

5.

know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I

were tried and convicted by a jury or by the court that I would
have a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Supreme
court of Utah for review of the trial proceedings and that if
could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal. that those costs
would be paid by the state without cost to me.

6.
J

I know and understand that by entering a plea of guilty

am waiving my constitutional rights as set out in the five pre-

ceding paragraphs and that I am.

in fact.

fully incriminating

am guilty of the crime that my plea of guilty

myself by admitting
is entered to.

7.

kncrw that under the laws of Utah that the sentence that

may be imposed upon me upon my plea of guilty is imprisonT·-0.r,1_

in 1_11e Utah State Prison for a term of _
1-1.

rh·..::

Lou.nty

..... r

t

-Jaj

l

_ __

years

for any term not exceedinq - - - - - - -

cnt!il .any amount 11ot.: in excess of

or

,1 tf·?;t lhis is the_ same sentence that could be imposed
aa
]'Jl

1 t: y

1

f

I

had stood

upon a plea of
I

THE
CLEl'U< OF
OISTillillCT
OF SALT LAKE couNT'V, UTA.H, DO HEREBY
CERTIFY THA.T THE A.NNEXEO ANO FOREQOINQ 16
A TRUE AND FUL..L COPY OF AN ORIGINAL DOCU·
MENT QN FILE IN MY OFFICE AS 8UCH CLl!:fllK.
HANO

"""1'

SE.AL 01"' 6AID

cog.:r.:::z-_

w.

•v

., -a

c..

2t..-

o:PVTV

I know that the fact that I have entered a plea of

B.

the court won't impose either a

guilty does not, mean ..

or

sentence of imprisonment upon me and no promises have been made
to me by anyone as to what the sentence will be

if I plead guilty

or that it will be made lighter because Of my guilty plea.
9,

No one has threatened or coerced ae to make me plead

am doing so of my a.m free will and after discussing

'Jl• i 1 ty and

1r

my attorney.

I know that any opinions he may have expresred

to ioe are not binding on the court.
10. No promises of any kind have been made to me to induce
me to plead guilty. except that I have been told that if I do
plead guilty to the charge mentioned above. other charges pending
against me in this or other courts

will be dismissed and that no

other charges will be filed against me for other offenses,

if

any, that I am known to have also cormnitted and for which no

charges have as yet been filed.

am not now under the influence of either drugs or

11.

alcohol.
12.

I have read this affidavit, or I have had it read to

me by my attorney. and I know and understand its contents.

__Ji___

years of age, have attended school through the

9 &adb

language.

I am

;,ft;£

• and I can read and understand the English

I have discussed its contents with my lawyer and ask

the court to accept my plea of guilty to the charge set forth

above in this affidavit because I did, in fact, on

• 19

z6

Dated this

;\it'':>C"!'"

ihed and sworn to before me in court this

AT fEST

WJT AUN$) Ell-'NS
,_..
CLERK
-

Ditpul)Clerll.

_j_J_
,,.. __

day

-)
.

, ert1f-,

I am the lawyer for
the defendant named above and I know he has

_ ·d
- 1Js:o,::i·1

dffid·'.l.''1t, or that
i

1_

,

,

Ji

.r-er1ts

I

have read it to him, and I dis-

him arul bel1eve he
ar,c'!

the besl -:-1f my
i:_inns and

i<>

fully understands the meaning

mentally and phy9i.cally competent.
and belief the statements, representamade by the defendant in the

foregoing

1rlavit are tn all respects accurate and true.

Based upon the facts set forth 1n the foregoing affidavit
and certification,

the court finds the defendant's plea of guilty

z

1s freely and voluntarily made and it is ordered that defendant's
plea of "guilty' be acceptea
1
Done in court this

_L_

+

entered. ; /

day of

i/7

E>TATt::: OF UT"H
C.OUNTY Of $ALT LAKE

(
I

I, THE
CL-ERK OF" THE OtSTRICT
COURT O>'
Lt>,KF COL•-..TY. UTAH, 00 HEREB'f
CEflTW'f THAT TH<- Ar.NE.>:.ED ANO F"OREGOINQ 16
A TPUE "'"-·') F"L"_L COPY 0"" AN ORIGINAL OOCU·
ME:NT O°' F'LE. JN "H QFF"•CE AS SUCH CL-ERK
H,t,ND
SEAL. OF 6AIO COURT
OF"

Th!S
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